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STUDENT SEARCHES - THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
AND THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
State v. Young'
Young and two other high school students were searched during school
hours on school premises by an assistant principal. The basis for the search
was that one of the students, on the approach of the assistant principal,
jumped up and put his hand into his pants.2 The three students were
ordered to empty their pockets and Young produced marijuana. The
Georgia Supreme Court held that the search was reasonable and, therefore, did not violate Young's fourth amendment rights. 8 The court further
stated that if the search had violated the fourth amendment, the evidence
would still have been admissible because the exclusionary rule applies
4
only to fourth amendment violations by law enforcement officers.
Student search cases have arisen from the widespread student unrest
of the late nineteen-sixties and early seventies and the concomitant phenomenon of increased drug use by students.5 Most of the cases have upheld the constitutionality of student searches. 6 In doing so, some cases
held that a public school official was not a government official. These
cases maintained that the school official acts as a private person when
7
he is searching a student and is not restrained by the fourth amendment.
This position may be correct in the case of officials of private schools,
but it is questionable if the searcher is a public school official.8 Other

cases have acknowledged that a school official is a government official
to whom the fourth amendment applies and have based the constitutionality of the search on the special relationship existing between student
and school official. 9 These cases reason that the school official acts in
loco parentisO to the student and, therefore, a lesser fourth amendment
1. 234 Ga. 488, 216 S.E. 2d 586, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1039 (1975).
2. Id. at 488, 216 S.E.2d at 588.
3. Id. at 494-95, 216 S.E.2d at 592.
4. Id. at 494, 216 S.E.2d at 591.
5. See Note, Balancing In Loco Parentis and the Constitution: Defining
the Limits of Authority Over Florida's Public High School Students, 26 U. FLA.
L. REv. 271 n.116 (1974).
6. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 978 (1973); Buss, The Fourth Amendment and
Searches of Students in Public Schools, 59 IowA L. REv. 739 (1974).
7. E.g., In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973); People
v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S.2d 731 (1971), aff'd, 30 N.Y.2d 734, 333
N.Y.S. 2d 167, 284 N.E.2d 153 (1972); Ranninger v. State, 460 S.W.2d 181 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1970); Mercer v. State, 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970); In re
Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969); People v. Overton,
24 N.Y.2d 522, 301 N.Y.S.2d 479, 249 N.E.2d 366 (1969).
8. See note 14 infra.
9. E.g., Moore v. Student Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala.
1968); In re C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320, 102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972); State v. Baccino,
282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971); In re G.C., 121 N.J. Super. 108, 296 A.2d 102
(1972).
10. The expression means: "In the place of a parent; instead of a parent;
charged, factitiously, with a parent's rights, duties, and responsibilities." BLACK's
LAW DIIONARY 896 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
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standard applies. To derive the appropriate fourth amendment standard,
the student's interest in his fourth amendment rights is balanced against
the state's interest in school officials carrying out their in loco parentis
function of maintaining order, discipline, and security in the schools. 1
2
This line of cases indicates that if the official has a "reasonable suspicion'
that the student has contraband, then the search is constitutional. Only
Louisiana has given its public school students the full panoply of fourth
amendment protection. In State v. Morn,' 3 the Louisiana Supreme Court
decided that a search of a student without a warrant based on probable
cause was unconstitutional.
The Young court conceded that a school official is a government official to whom the fourth amendment is applicable. 14 However, the court
placed heavy emphasis on the official's duty to maintain a safe and secure
environment for all students and determined that a search directed toward
that end is reasonable, although based on less than probable cause, under
the fourth amendment.1 5 The Young court concluded that if a school official searches a student in the "good faith" exercise of his school function,
the search is constitutional.' 6
This standard is lower than the "reasonable suspicion" standard
adopted by the majority of the courts which have held that the school
official is a government official subject to the fourth amendment.' 7 In
the cases which adopted the "reasonable suspicion" standard, the school
official had some cause for belief that a particular student possessed a
specific kind of contraband.' 8 In Young, however, the principal searched

three students because one of them acted "suspiciously." The court did
not say whether Young was the student who behaved suspiciously or
19
what kind of contraband the principal thought he might have had.
Under the standard for student searches applied in Young, the school
official does not have to suspect that a particular student possesses a
particular kind of contraband in order for his search of the student to
11. See State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971).
12. "Reasonable suspicion" is the normal standard for stop and frisk searches,
but this standard is ordinarily not applied to full searches. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
13.. 307 So. 2d 317 (La. 1975), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975).
14. The court stated: "[I]t [is] too plain to be controverted that school
234 Ga. at 494, 216
officials are state officers acting under color of law.
S.E.2d at 591.
15. Id. at 496, 216 S.E.2d at 592.
16. Id, at 496, 216 S.E.2d at 592-93.
17. Like "probable cause" and the "reasonable man" standards, the "reasonable suspicion" standard is an objective standard subject to review by the courts.
18. E.g., State v. Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971) (Principal knew
student was out of class illegally and was known to the principal to have used
drugs. After student resisted principal's attempt to take his coat, principal felt
a bulge in the coat and searched it).
19. The court's only statement was, "as the principal approached 'one of
the fellows jumped up and put something down, ran his hand in his pants.'"

The court record fails to say whether Young did anything which could be
construed as "suspicious."
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/13
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be reasonable. The court implied that if one student among a group of
students appears to a school official to behave somewhat peculiarly, then
the official can search that student and the other members of the group
without violating the students' fourth amendment rights. The search in
Young clearly would not have been constitutional under the "reasonable
suspicion" standard as applied by the courts which have adopted that
standard.
Since Mapp v. Ohio,20 evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment has been inadmissible under the exclusionary rule in a criminal
prosecution. The United States Supreme Court justices have differed in
their views as to the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule. Some have
said its primary purpose is to preserve the integrity of the judicial system, 21
while others have said its most important function is to deter the police
from violating the fourth amendment by conducting illegal searches. 22
The Young court accepted the current majority view that the rule's primary purpose is to deter the police from violating the fourth amendment.2 3
The court stated that the exclusionary rule had been applied only to
fourth amendment violations by law enforcement officers and was not
applicable to fourth amendment violations by public school officials. 2"
The Young court reasoned that recent decisions of the Supreme Court
tend to limit the application of the rule and that they would be holding against these cases if they extended the rule to apply to violations
by school officials.2 5 In support of this position, the court quoted from a
27
law review article 26 which asserted that United States v. Robinson,
28
29
Gustafson v. Florida, and United States v. Calandra indicated that the
Supreme Court would not be willing to extend the exclusionary rule beyond
its present application.3 0
Calandra indicated that the Supreme Court was limiting the application of the exclusionary rule but not in the manner suggested by Young.
20. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Mapp extended the exlusionary rule to the states.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), formulated the exclusionary rule,
but it was applicable only to the federal courts until Mapp.
21. E.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In dissent, Justice
Brennan said:
[T]he exclusionary rule . . . [enabled] the judiciary to avoid the taint
of partnership in official lawlessness and of assuring the people . . .
that the government would not profit from its lawless behavior..
Id. at 357.
22. "The rule is calculated to . . . deter . . . by removing the incentive
to disregard . . . [the fourth amendment]." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206, 217 (1960).
23. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974), stated that, "the
rule's prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct."
24. 234 Ga. at 489, 494, 216 S.E.2d at 589, 591.
25. Id.
26. Note, Death Knell of the Exclusionary Rule?, 1 HASINGS CoNST. L.Q.
179, 212 (1974).

27. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
28. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
29. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
30. 234 Ga. at 491, 216 S.E.2d at 590.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
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Calandra'srefusal to extend the rule to a grand jury proceeding supports
the conclusion that the Supreme Court may be willing to limit the application of the rule to criminal proceedings in which the defendant's guilt
or innocence is to be determined. 31 However, nowhere in its opinion did

the Court suggest that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment may be admissible in a criminal prosecution of the person whose
rights were violated.3 2 The court in Young misconstrued the nature of
the limitation the Supreme Court seems willing to place on the rule.

Calandrasuggested only that the Court may limit the type of proceedings

to which the rule will apply.3 3 It did not suggest that the rule would
be applied to unlawful searches by law enforcement officers but not to
unlawful searches by other government officials. In both Robinson and
Gustafson the evidence was admissible because the search, as incident to
an arrest, was reasonable. 34 These cases suggest that the Supreme Court
is limiting the use of the exclusionary rule by narrowing the scope of
the fourth amendment. They do not, however, suggest that evidence seized
by the government in violation of the fourth amendment may be used
in a criminal prosecution of the person whose rights were violated.
The analysis of the scope of the exclusionary rule in Young is unsound. The thrust of the exclusionary rule is that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment cannot be used in a criminal prosecution
31. The Court's discussion of the exclusionary rule supports the conclusion
that the rule applies in every case where illegally obtained evidence is sought
to be introduced in a criminal prosecution. The Court stated:
[S]tanding to invoke the exclusionary rule has been confined to situations where the Government seeks to use such evidence to incriminate
the victim of the unlawful search. [The] standing rule is premised on
a recognition .

.

. [of a] •

.

. need for deterrence ....

[The] rationale

for excluding the evidences are strongest where the Government's unlawful conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction on the
victim of the search.
414 U.S. 338, 348 (emphasis added).
32. Calandra did, however, suggest that presented with the proper case the
Court may decide whether the rule should be retained. The Court said, "We
have no occasion in the present case to consider the extent of the rule's efficacy
in criminal trials." Id. at n.5.
33. Calandra would be applicable if Young had involved the use of the
evidence against the student in an administrative disciplinary proceeding. Neither
administrative disciplinary proceedings nor grand jury proceedings amount to
a criminal prosecution. In Young, however, the evidence was used to obtain a
criminal conviction. The holding in Calandra seems wholly irrelevant to that
situation.
34. The police officer in Robinson had probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving while his license was revoked. The officer made a full

custody arrest of the defendant and then conducted a full search of his person.

414 U.S. 218, 220-23. The Supreme Court held that the search did not violate
the fourth amendment, and the heroin seized was admissible in evidence against

the defendant. Id. at 236. In Gustafson, a companion case to Robinson, the
defendant was placed under arrest for failure to have his operator's license in
his possession. The Court held that upon arresting the defendant the officer
was entled to make a full search of defendant's person as incident to the
lawful arrest. 414 U.S. 260, 266.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/13
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of the person whose rights have been violated.3 5 In maintaining that the
rule applies only to an unlawful search by a "law enforcement officer,"
the court in Young completely ignored the view that at least one purpose
of the rule is to protect judicial integrity. The essence of this view is
that the judiciary should not appear to condone lawless government conduct by permitting the government to use unlawfully obtained evidence
in a court of law.3 6 A school official's violation of a student's fourth
amendment rights constitutes unlawful governmental conduct. Evidence
seized thereby should not be admissible in a court of law. Permitting the
government to use unlawfully seized evidence in a criminal prosecution
of the person whose rights it violated impairs the integrity of the judiciary
whether the evidence was seized by a law enforcement officer or some
other government official. In either case the judiciary is tacitly condoning
unlawful governmental conduct.
Young's interpretation of the "deterrent purpose" of the exclusionary
rule is too narrow. The court placed too much emphasis on the literal
language of the United States Supreme Court justices who take the view
that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful
police conduct. The Young court is not justified in construing the justices'
use of the word "police"3 7 to mean that they are not concerned with
deterring the unlawful conduct of other government officials. The exclusionary rule can deter all governmental officials. A school official who
suspects that a student possesses drugs or other unlawful contraband is
probably interested in a criminal conviction of the student. If he knows
that evidence seized in violation of the student's fourth amendment rights
will not be admissible in a criminal prosecution of the student, he will
probably be more concerned with observing those rights.
The minimal fourth amendment standard for student searches applied in Young and its holding that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable
to student searches give the Georgia student little protection from arbitrary searches by school officials. A fourth amendment standard based
on the searcher's "good faith" is practically no standard at all. "Good
faith" is an entirely subjective standard. There is no objective criterion
by which the court can measure the reasonableness of the search. Only
the searcher's motive for conducting the search is questioned. If the searcher's motive for conducting the search is to insure that the school is a safe
and secure environment for the students, it does not matter that the
search was prompted by the school official's completely irrational sus35. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961). In Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927), the Court stated:

[T]he doctrine... [cannot] be tolerated under our constitutional system,
that evidences of crime discovered by a federal officer in making a
search without lawful warrant may be used against the victim of the
unlawful search. ...
Id. at 29-30.
36. See note 18 supra.
37. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
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picions3 8 Under this standard, "shake-down" searches, such as those shown
by the record in Mercer v. State,3 9 would be constitutional even if the
school official irrationally believed that drugs were on the school premises.
The "good faith" standard adopted by Young gives the school official
no incentive to observe the rights of students. Because of the great unliklihood that a court would find that he conducted the search in bad faith,
the official has no inducement even to learn what rights the students have.
The "reasonable suspicion" standard should be the minimal standard
for student searches. This standard adequately serves the state's interest
of maintaining order, discipline, and security in the school while it gives
the students something more than token fourth amendment protection
from arbitrary searches by school officials. Unless the school official has
some basis for believing that a particular student probably possesses a
specific kind of contraband, the fourth amendment should prohibit his
search of the student. A mere rumor that a student uses drugs or a school
official's good faith "hunch" that the student possesses drugs should never
be enough to cloak the search of that student with constitutionality. If
the search does not meet the "reasonable suspicion" standard, the evidence
seized by the search should be excluded in a criminal prosecution of
the student. Allowing the government to use evidence in a criminal prosecution which it seized in violation of the fourth amendment amounts to
tacit judicial approval of unlawful government conduct. Judicial integrity
cannot be protected by applying the exclusionary rule to only the "law
enforcement" element of government. To accomplish this purpose the
rule must be applied to all government officials.
CHARLEs

F.

JAmES

88. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
89. 450 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). The search in Mercer was not
a "shake-down" search, but the record before the court showed that it was the
practice of the principal to conduct "shake-down" searches of large groups of
students when he deemed it necessary. Id. at n.8.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol41/iss4/13
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